INTRODUCTION
This report describes a method for surveying failure data to estimate the fraction of dependent failures and its contribution to system unavailability that is composed of several redundant components. The method compares the distribution of actual time-between-failures with the distribution expected if the failures were independent. The differences between these two distributions reflect dependent failures. Based on this method, software is being developed to estimate the fraction of component failures that are dependent, and system unavailability with this degree of dependency.
Dependent failures have been widely recognized as important contributors to risk. This report builds on earlier pioneering methods for analyzing dependent failures) 3 More recently, NUREG/CR-47804, Section 5, proposed exploring common-cause failures (CCFs) using the concept of root cause, coupling mechanisms, and defensive mechanisms. NUREG/CR-54605 further expanded on a comprehensive picture of CCFs that explicitly identifies the role of coupling and defenses through postulated generic classes of CCF mechanisms and cause-defense matrices. These studies resulted in general guidelines for assessing the potential for the occurrence of, and defenses against, common-cause events. Although these studies increased our understanding of the way CCFs occur and can be defended in a qualitative manner, they do not address quantitative aspects of the problem.
Also, NUREG/CR-4780 and NUREG/CR-5460 emphasize the lack of sufficient plant-specific data to develop meaningful_ estimates of CCF rates. This study attempts to provide a bridge between qualitative and quantitative assessments of CCFs, and also outlines an approach that can be used to analyze dependent failures from plant-specific data. The report describes basic models that can be used to estimate the potential for CCFs using plant operational data which are not necessarily limited to simultaneous failures of multiple components.
Further, we describe specific methods consistent with the content of the data for estimating the CCF rate. Finally, specific indicators of CCFs are described and their capabilities are evaluated. Risk formulation of dependent failures, in general, are also detailed.
Overview
This section gives an overview of the methodology developed; to introduce the subject, we first define dependent and independent failures.
The failure of components in PSAs can be classified as independent and dependent. Independent failures are completely autonomous events. The failure of one component does not affect the performance of any other component, and, when a failure is repaired and the component is returned to service, the same component could fail again, without influence from the previous failure, lt is very important to emphasize that there are hard-wired dependencies between the components in a system. These dependencies will always exist in a system as long as its design is unchanged. Examples of the hard-wired dependencies are those between support systems and front-line systems, i.e., a starting-air system (support system) providing the air to start a diesel generator (flont-line system). If the startingair system fails, the diesel generator invariably will fail to start. However, this direct dependency is completely defined, and can be modeled at the level of fault trees. Even if the support system is only degraded, the performance of the front-line system also will be degraded.
In more formal terms, independence between failures means that if several failures are observed, then ali these failures obey the product law of probability (here called Totality of Product Law).
For example, if we have two independent failures A and B, then, the probability of the two failures happening is exactly:
and Qx represents the probability of X happening, i.e., instantaneous unavailability which is usually a function of time.
However, PSA studies generally use the average probability of failure (average unavailability) over a long period, which we will denote by _. Then, the probability of the two failures happening is:
Exprcssion (2) may lead to errors in the calculations. For example, when the instantaneous unavailabilities of A and B are correlated in time, independence between failures may happen only at instantane, ,,:v moments.
only if Q_is the instantaneous unavailability probability of X happening.
Dependent failures are failures of several components due to a common cause or "shock". Hence, dependent failures are known as "Common-Cause Failures". Since, in principle, a common cause or "shock" will affect several similar components, dependent failures also are known as "Common-'t tt • Mode Fa_ tires. In this report, we use the term dependent failures (DF) D,:;,cndent failures are very important for a PSA study because they can affect several critical c, omi_, r,,,_ _,_, mal,'.it_,!.. __:dundancy in a train or system useless) and, therefore, their impact on risk cap. __.. h_!,? _._x_ the other hand, it is important not to overestimate them by assuming that ali componen¢,_:i_-: • :.:-: ,:_,, or f_vt,, :_i,nilar components in several systems, are subjected to dependent failures. "i .:_',ts.hock is used to cover ali circumstances that can affect several components, for exampl_, '._:; ..... _,,r,_.el_ts (temperature, humidity, vibration) that might affect ali the components in a ro(), , _,ingbetween failures is a very important issue in dependent failure analysis. In general, even if : .__;:affects several components, this does not necessarily mean that all the components will fail at the., .r¢etime (simultaneously). This could be the case, but more generally the shock will significantly i_, ,_se the failure rates of the affected components, and the components affected by the same shock.
.:i'-_we.ntually fail at some short interval from each other• The more severe the shock, the shoru _be interval.
i: ,rc, if the impact of dependent failures is to be assessed, and if, for this purpose, the obscr .
failures in a plant are compiled, the history of failures can be depicted as in Figure 1 .
to time Figure 1 . Example of failure clustering
In this diagram, we depicted hypothetical observations of the behavior (occurrence of failures) of several components as a function of time, starting from time t 0. At this point, we do not know which failures are independent and which failures are dependent. If the reports from the plants were detailed enough, then tracing the cause of the failures would be sufficient to determine which ones share the same cause; and the rest would be independent failures. However, in most cases, the information given in the failure reports is not detailed enough to tell if a group of failures, out of the complete population, have occurred from the same cause. Hence, to assess the contribution of dependent failures to the unavailability of a system, it is necessary to assess the degree of dependency shown by field failure data from a nuclear power plant. The degree of dependency is best described by the degree to which observations deviate from what is expected under the independence assumption. The degree of deviation is estimated by the significance of the difference between an observed measure and its expectation under the independence assumption. Significance, here, is defined by the probability laws governing the likelihood of the observation (significance level). As described later, the measure is related to the expected time required for observing a failure of two or more individual redundant components. Other measures or risk-based indicators can be developed by estimating the system unavailability (minimal cutset probability) based on observed failures and accounting for dependency, predicting the system unavailability under the independence assumption, and taking .the difference between the two. Again, the significant deviation (difference) is inferred based on probability laws.
The methodology for these analyses will be discussed in Section 2, and the mathematical development in the appendices. However, the methodology is based on the identification of dependency between failures, given their closeness (in time) of occurrence.
The methodology looks at the overall behavior (in time) of the failure of the components, and then evaluates the indications for dependent failures. Therefore, even if locally ltaere is indication of dependency or non-dependency between failures, the overall behavior will be ex_mined to assess the dependent failure indicators.
Two important examples of the local effects are illustrated in Figure 1' 1. Even if several failures happen simultaneously, or very close in time, they may be independent failures which happen to occur at the same time (for example, Figure 1 , failures F 5, F6 and F7). For standby components and for practical purposes, such closeness refers to periods that are comparable with the component test intervals. Assuming the interval between occurrence of the failures to be the same as the intervals between the discovery of failures, plus and minus one half test interval will have minimal effect on the dependency analyses.
2. Even if several failures do not occur close in time, they may be related by the same cause (for example, failures Ft, F2, and F4 in Figure 1 ). In this case, the pattern of consecutive occurrence of failure_ in three different components may be indicative of dependency.
The development of dependent failure indicators presented here has the following features:
1. An unavailability expression (formula) is developed to take into account the contribution from dependent failures. This expression allows for a more accurate evaluation of unavailability than the traditional formula employed in today's PSAs.
2. The identification of dependent failures does not require them to be simultaneous.
3. Dependent failure indicators can be determined from a small amount of raw failure data.
4.
The methodology can be applied to the failure observations of each particular plant, and therefore, can generate dependent failure indicators for each plant Though this feature might not seem very important, it has a very important implicatio-,, namely, that generally, to evaluate the common-cause contribution in a PSA, generic data sources are consulted, and they present the average behavior of a large population of plants over a long period. However, the common-cause contribution for a particular plant may be quite different from the population average. This difference can underestimate or overestimate the commo.,,_-cause contribution.
5.
As shown before, the method can look at the overall behavior with time of the failures, thereby avoiding, as much as possible, local effects which can be misleading.
This report is organized in two volumes. The first volume presents a summary description of the methodology developed (Section 2), the results obtained (Section 3), and the conclusions (Section 4). Volume 2 is comprised of 7 appendices, with each appendix describing in detail a related subject.
2.

APPROACH
In most cases, the contribution sf Common-Cause Fail_,res (CCF) to the risk of a plant in a PSA study is evaluated by consulting the values in a generic source. However, such values have been averaged over two domains: the average of several plants, and the average over a long time. However, because a particular nuclear power plant has its own environment, equipment, and operating procedures, these averaged values n.ay be several orders of magnitude smaller or larger than the real contribution. Therefore, as a first step to evaluate the CCF contribution for a particular plant, field failure data must be collected, so that the information resembles, as much as tx_ssible, the actual failure behavior of the plant.
However, as we mentioned in the Introduction, if there was enough information to assess the cause of every failure then it would be possible to evaluate accurately the contri_ution of CCF to the risk of a plant. Since this is not the case, then we propose that the CCF contribution is evaluated by statistically testing for dependency in the raw failure data. Accordingly, the methodology developed allows for dependency to be evaluated, which is not exactly what the term Common-Cause Failures means, i.e., several simultaneous failures due to the same cause.
However, we note that thc term Common-Cause Failure (CCF) has been used rather loosely in the PSA ficld, lt was used to explain previous occurrences of simultaneous failures, but in some cases, it was merely incorporated to improve the prediction of system unavailabilities.
The methodology presentcd here for dependency indicators has two direct contributions to the evaluation of dcpendent failures:
1. It provides a new formulation for the unavailability expression used in PSAs, which can take into account the contribution from dependent failures.
:2. It provides a better estimation of the/_ factor or the parameters of other conventional CCF models.
In addition, the mcthodology can assess the degree of dependency in a particular set of field failure data. A measure of dependency also is proposed.
New Expression for Average Unavailability Accounting
When assessing the impact of dependent failures on the unavailability of a system, it is important to evaluate the unavailability of at least k components failing out of n. For example, if there are five electrical diesel generators in a nuclear power plant (n=5), then what is the probability that at least two (k=2) of them are unavailable?, and what is the probability that at least tbur (k=4), out of the five (n=5) diesel generators, arc unavailable?
The methodology presented proposes an accurate expression for the average unavailability of at least k components failing out of n. Detailed derivation of the average system unavailability accounting for both failure and maintenance downtimes is discussed in Appendix B of Volume 2. l-lcre, for the sake of simplicity, we concentrate on the contributioa of the average system unavailability resulting from the component failures accounting for possible clustering of failure times. The more comprehensive and expanded formulations given in Appendix B will not be discussed in this volume. The new expression for the average unavailability of at least k components failing o.t of n is the following:
where T is the test interval, Aj is a f_mction of (depends on) only _j, and the parameters _i incorporate the dependency contributic n, if any. The parameter _i is typically defined as the reciprocal of the expected incremental cycle duration. This duration of "j_can be envisioned as the expected difference between the time required to observe the failure of "j"different redundant components and the time required to observe the failure of "j-l" different redundant components. If this time difference is short, then the "jth"failures were most rrobably due to the same degradation mechanism that disabled the previous "j-l" redundancies. The shorter this duration, the greater the value for _i' which indicates the degree of dependency for the "jth"failure.
For example, for one out of two, components being unavailable, Eqn. (4) reduces to:
where A 1 --_1.
For the case of two out of two components being unavailable, Eqn. (2) reduces to: 
Equation (6) can be simplified to illustrate the consistency of these equations with the current approach for estimating average system unavailability. To do so, the exponential term has to be expanded using a tailor series up to the cubic term. That is:
substituting Eqn. (9) into Eqn. (6), and with simple manipulation, Eqn. (10) can be obtained.
Under the independence assumption, the values of _t and ¢2 are related to the individual component failure rate _. by the following relationship:
Here, for the system unavailability under the independence assumption is:
To illustrate the change in system unavailability when failures are clustered, a new value for Ez greater than ¢1/2 has to be assumed. If this value is denoted by ¢'2' then the dependent contribution to the system unavailability is:
The Equivalent Beta Factor _) then can be expressed by:
Note, that if ali failures are simultaneous failures detected in one test interval, then the value for _'2is 3rF (since, on average, the failures could have been only one third of the test interval apart). In this case, the Beta Factor will be maximum and approaches unity. Equation (4) allows the determination of overall system unavailability from both independent and dependent contributions. However, it is important to note here that Eqn. (4) does not account for system unavailability due to maintenance downtimes. This contribution shall be handled separately. The detailed derivation of Eqn. (4) is shown in Appendix B, Volume 2.
Expression for the fl Factor
In the previous section we discussed a derivation of the fl factor based on the parameters of the new formulation of system unavailability composed of two redundancies. In this section, a general approach for the determination offl factors for any number of redundancy is discussed. To extract the conventional fl factor, we can use the following procedure. We can say that the unavailability of a system due to failures is given by dependent and independent contributions. That is:
The dependent contributioi: ;s the unavailability of a single component corrected by the fl factor. Thus, Eqn. (15) becomes:
where Q, ms_ is the average unavailability commonly used in PSAs:
and Qindependent is the estimated probability, using the conventional PRA formula, that several components have failed independently. When a dependency is detected, the parameter _i incorporates the dependency information from the field failure data into the PSA calculations. Thus, the parameters _j are statistical estimations of dependency from observed failure data.
2.3
Dep.endency Indicators Since the parameter _i incorporates the dependency information from the field failure data into the PSA calculations, a methodology was developed to identify dependency between failures. In other words, statistical indicators of non-random failures have been developed. We started by noting that when there is dependency between failures, the failures become clustered. Clustering of failures are caused by a conditioning event which increases the failure rate among similar components. The increase in failure rate is terminated when a complete repair takes place. Therefore, three main processes are identified:
1. Occurrence of conditioning events or shocks which will trigger the process of dependency.
2. The failure rate of several similar components is increased.
3. There is an operational feedback to perform a complete repair on a single component when it fails, or on ali similar components when a cluster of failures occur.
The effect of a shock is totally eliminated when ali components affected are repaired. Another shock may occur again in the future, and the process of repair will take piace once more.
To study the effect of shocks on the clustering of failures, several concepts are introduced. First, a failure sequence of any length is assigned a code. The code is a numerical value equal to the number of different components that are failed within the failure sequence. By simply looking at the sequence of failures depicted in Figure 2 , and in the absence of detailed information about the cause of each failure, it is not possible to assess if there is dependency between the failures. However, to develop the methodology of dependency indicators, several definitions are proposed. The new concepts defined are shown in Figure 3 .
The first important concept is the "Minimal Sequence Cycle of Code K", denoted as MSC-K, which is a sequence of failure such that the first k components were involved. For instance, a Minimal Sequence Cycle of Code 3 is a sequence of failures until three different components have failed; in The next important concept is that of "Minimal Cycle Duration", which is the length of time that a particular MSC-K takes to fail. For example, the minimal cycle duration of the MSC-3 illustrated in Figure 3 , is the length of time from toto the first failure of C (fifth failure since the observation starting point, to). The third concept is that of "Incremental Cycle Duration," which is the length of time for a MSC-K to become a MSC-(K+I).
Thus, there is an incremental cycle duration to go from an MSC-1 to an MSC-2, from an MSC-2 to an MSC-3, and so on. As an example, Figure 3 shows the incremental cycle duration from the MSC-3 ABABC to the MSC-4 ABABCBCAD.
According to these definitions, and the clustering (shock) model described above, then if a dependency exists, it is due to a shock that has increased the failure rate of the components, thereby causing clustering of the failures and decreasing both the minimal cycle duration and the incremental cycle duration. Since we are assuming that the failures are repaired after a shock, then the process has no memory of failures that have occurred in the past; therefore, as a first approximation, we propose that the distribution of the incremental cycle duration is characterized by the exponential distribution, that is:
where, w is the incremental length period for MSC-K compared to MSC-(K-1), and is the parameter characterizing the exponential distribution.
Therefore, by fitting the field failure data to exponential distributions, such as that shown in expression (16), the parameters/_i of Eqn. (5) can be determined. If there is dependency between the failures, then its contribution to the average system unavailability will be taken into account by the parameters _i of Eqn. (4).
The methodology developed is not restricted to an exponential distribution and, in fact, several statistical tests (statistical evaluation of cycle duration and incremental cycle duration) to detect clustering and dependency may be attempted:
. Cox Interspacing Model
An attempt may be made to fit the field failure data to any of these models, and then to use the best fit to estimate the parameters _i" Appendix D describes these tests in detail.
In addition, it is useful to calculate the average system unavailability more accurately using Eqn. (4); the parameters _i are dependency indicators themselves. However, they are not indicative by themselves of the presence of dependency in a particular set of field failure data. To obtain an indication of the dependency in such a set, the incremental cycle durations characterized by the parameters _j may be used to obtain the distribution of the Minimal Cycle Durations. Appendix A describes in detail the derivation of these "Durations." Once these "Durations" are obtained, parameters can be obtained to decide whether or not there is dependency in a set of data or not.
First, under the assumption of independence, the Minimal Cycle Durations are obtained. Then, the actual Minimal Cycle Durations are obtained from the field failure data. If there is dependency, it is because a shock has happened, increasing the failure rate, and therefore, decreasing the Minimal Cycle Durations. Therefore, a parameter a k can be the measure or indicator of dependency if we define it as the ratio of the actual Minimal Cycle Durations over the Minimal Cycle Durations under the assumption of independence, i.e.,
where, fk is a measure of the Minimal Cycle Duration for cycle k. Appendix A gives a formal definition of this parameter.
Formal methodologies have been introduced in this report to estimate the mean and standard deviation (o) of ak under the assumption of independence.
Significant deviations from the independence assumption can then be expressed in terms of number of standard deviations away from the expectation (e.g., 30 deviation). Thus, formal probabilistic confidence bounds can be assigned to the dependency inference.
3.
RESULTS
The methodology proposed has been tested using simulation studies and pilot applications, details of which are given in Appendices F and G. Here, we briefly summarize the conclusions and some of the quantitative results obtained from this study.
There several definitions and formulations that need to be discussed before presenting our quantitative results. The PRA (PSA) approximate unavailability of multiple components as used in this report, is calculated using the following equation.
where, Qk.n: is the PSA approximate unavailability of k or more redundancy out of n redundant components under independence assumption.
qs: is the PSA unavailability of a single component defined by:
;tT (24) qs = where _. is the failure rate for single diesel generator and T is the test interval.
The exact unavailability of k or more out of n redundancy, as was described in the previous section, and was given by Eqn. (4), is repeated here for clarity:
where T is the test interval, and Ai is a function of only _i' The above equation, Eqn. (25), can be quantified under two conditions which result in "Exact System Unavailability Under Independence Assumption", and "Exact System Unavailability Accounting For Dependence." The exact system unavailability under independence assumption is calculated when ali values of _i are calculated, based on their relation to _1as prescribed by independence assumption. The exact system unavailability accounting for dependence is calculated when ali values of _is are estimated, based on field data not the independence relationship based on -_r This basically illustrates the versatility of Eqn. (25) for both cases of independence and dependence. In tabulated results that will be discussed next, Case 1 refers to the PSA approximate equation, Case 2 refers to the exact system unavailability under assumption of independence, and Case 3 refers to the exact system unavailability accounting for dependence.
Finally, the partial fl factors of Type 1 are calculated based on the difference between the exact system unavailability accounting for dependence (Case 3), and the PSA approximate system unavailability (Case 1). The partial fl factor of Type 2 are calculated based on the difference between the exact system unavailability accounting for dependency (Case 3) and the exact system unavailability under the independence assumption (Case 2).
Simulation Studies
Clustering of failures is usually caused by a conditioning/triggering event which increases the local failure rate among similar components that are affected by the condition. To study the effects of triggering events on the clustering of failures, and to evaluate the applicability of the methods developed in this study, we used a simulation approach. Our objective was to assess the appropriateness of the developed methods by computerized simulation of observations on component failure times, estimation of the system unavailability, and the clustering parameters, and compare these with the simulated values. The PSA approximate system unavailability based on simulated data was also calculated to show the improvement in the accuracy of estimation that can be obtained by using the methods developed here.
Appendix F has a detailed description of simulation case runs and these comparisons. The basic conclusions are summarized here:
1. For simulated failure times based on the assumption of independence, the methods developed provide accurate estimates of the system unavailability in agreement with the simulated quantities. The PRA approximate system unavailability for one out of two redundant system underestimate the simulated unavailability by about 30%. For higher levels of redundancy, the degree of underestimation in the PRA approximate unavailability significantly increases, e.g., a factor of about 2.5 for four redundant trains.
2. For simulated failure times accounting for dependency, i.e., simulated based on a periodic triggering event occurring with a frequency of about once a year and causing an increase in failure rate by a factor of 20 for a period of two months and then returning to its nominal failure rate, the following conclusions were reached (note, data was simulated for 10 years):
a. Clustering was detected and reflected in the estimates of the model parameters more than 80% of the time for systems composed of two or four redundant trains.
b. System unavailability calculated using the models developed in this study underestimated by about 30% for two redundant trains and about 50% for four redundant trains. These results were promising in comparison with the PSA approximate unavailabilities which underestimated system unavailability by a factor of 2.5 for a two-train system, and a factor of 10 for a four-train system. In 50% of simulation runs, no simultaneous failure of two or more components occurred within a test interval; therefore, it will be : almost impossible to estimate an accurate fl factor based on simultaneous failures of multiple components. The Type 2 partial fl factors typically calculated in these simulation studies for a four train system based on our clustering model are:
c. The degree of clustering and the estimated partial fl factors increase almost proportional to the effect of conditioning or triggering events in terms of the magnitude of the increase in failure rate and the duration that this increase is sustained. The latter is a function of the maintenance strategies in the plant, that is, the effect of the conditioning event on the increase in failure rate will be eliminated if ali the redundant components have been repaired. The repair of a redundant component may be initiated before its failure due to either an understanding of the cause of failure in other redundant components and determining if other redundant trains are susceptible, or due to detection of failure clustering in other redundant trains. Activities which control the duration of the failure increase are referred to as operational feedback mechanisms.
In conclusion, the simulation studies indicated the potential usefulness of these types of approach and set the stage for further validation through pilot applications.
Pilot Applications
Eight pilot applications of the methodology were made using the actual field data on failure times. Each pilot application was designated by a plant code:
Plant 1 -Diesel generator failure times were retrieved from the utility PSA (Individual Plant Examination-IPE Submittal). The data spans from 2/3/82 through 12/31/89. This two-unit plant initially had four diesel generators, with a fifth diesel added and operational on 2/17/87. Plant 2 -Diesel Generator failure times were retrieved from Nuclear Power Reliability Data System (NPRDS) from January 1988 through March 1992. This two-unit plant had five diesel generators.
Plants 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8 -The breakers associated with containment cooling fans were studied. Each plant has four sets of breakers (except plant, 8 which had eight sets). The purpose of this study was to determine the plant-to-plant variability for single and multiple failure rates. Plant 8 analyses are discussed in Appendix G; they will not be summarized in this volume because of the difference in the number of breakers and the associated data.
Plant 7 -The four dampers associated with containment fans were studied. As expected, the failure rates were quite small and the data sparse. We obtained 11 failures during about 14 years. No significant dependencies were observed. This pilot study is discussed in Appendix G; it will not be discussed here.
The objective, main conclusions, and some of the quantitative results obtained for each of the case studies are discussed below; detailed quantitative results are given in Appendix G.
Plant 1
The r,,:,in objective of Plant 1 study was to ascertain whether the conclusion of the utility's IPE, that is a lack of any common cause in failure of Diesel Generators, can be supported by the new methodology.
Two sets of quantitative results were generated. The first set of results, in Tables 1, 2 , and 3 incorporate data for both valid and non-valid multiple diesel-generator failures; Tables 4, 5, and 6 exclude the non-valid multiple failures to be consistent with the utility assumptions. The definition of Cases 1, 2, and 3 is the same as that described earlier in this chapter. The definition of the partial fl factors of Types 1 and 2, again, is the same as that discussed earlier in this chapter; however, the following points will provide a formulation for the way these quantities were derived. is the actual unavailability of k out of n diesel generators. These are the results generated from Case 3.
q_.n" is the unavailability of k out of n diesel generators, calculated under assumption of independence. If q_,uis used from Case 2, gives an actual partial beta factor supported by data and is referred to by "Type 2." If q[n is used from Case 1, it gives a correction factor that includes both the underestimation resulted from the use of PSA approximate formula for system unavailability as well as the dependency effect, and is referred to as "Type 1."
The following conclusions can be drawn from Tables 1 through 6.
1. Conventional PRA calculations significantly underestimate multiple diesel unavailabilities under assumption of independence (comparison of Case 1 with Case 2).
2. The actual clustering/dependency exhibited by the data has a minimal effect on estimates of multiple DG unavailability (at maximum, a factor of 2 based on comparison of Cases 2 and 3). Tables 3 and 6 provide partial fl factors calculated with methods described earlier. We note that the partial fl factors from type 1 are those to be used with the IPE submittal to provide proper estimates of the unavailability of multiple diesel generators. As Tables 3 and 6 show, we find little dependency in diesel failures, consistent with the conclusions of the conclusions of the utility's PRA.
3.
4. The IPE submittal calculated the diesel generator unavailability based on failure per demand. The demand-failure rates were indicative of an improving trend after 02/17/87. Furthermore, the fifth diesel generator appeared to have a different demand-failure rate compared to the others. Our methodology estimates and uses failure rate per unit time.
We did not find any evidence of a significant improving trend after 02/17/87. Furthermore, the failure of the fifth diesel generator was consistent with that of the other diesel generators. The approach of failure rate per demand also underestimated single diesel unavailability. Ali these differences between the two approaches stems from the fact that the diesel demands were clustered. For example, the T.S. required many additional demands on the redundant diesel whenever one of the diesels was under repair. We concluded that an approach based on demand failure rate for stand-by components should be avoided unless there is a uniform distribution of demands throughout the observation period.
Plant 2
The main objective of studying the diesel generators at Plant 2 was to evaluate their susceptibility to dependent failures. This plant had a recent incident involving the unavailability of four out of five diesels. Therefore, finding a significant dependency among the failure of diesel generators, when this recent event is excluded, to some extent will validate the methodology developed here.
The raw data were retrieved from the NPRDS; about 4 years and 3 months of operational data during ali modes of plant operation were collected from January 1988 to March 1992. The interpretation of this data required some judgment. A failure was decided to have happened if the following criterion (C) was satisfied: Failure would result in EDG not successfully responding to loss of offsite power for a mission time of 24 hours. To apply this criterion, the interpretation of the failure data followed these guidelines: Ali failures, resulting from ali causes including automatic response, some operator action or auto start, were counted as failures as long as the above criterion (C) was satisfied. This interpretation of the data was performed independently by two staff members who identified 90 potential failures.
Following the methods described earlier, the unavailability of the diesel generators was estimated, taking into account the dependency between the failures, and not taking them into account. Table  7 compares these new values with the approximate PSA system unavailability described earlier. Cases 1, 2, and 3 in Table 7 are defined as before. Table 7 shows that when five diesels are out, even when no dependency is taken into account, the BNL exact calcula:ion is about one order of magnitude larger than traditional PRA calculations. When the approximate PRA calculations are compared with the BNL exact calculations including dependency, it is clear that the PRA calculations underestimate the unavailability by about two orders of r_:agnitude. Due to this significant difference, it can be concluded that here there is dependency amongst the failures. This dependency, in turn, affects the unavailability of the diesel generators.
The approximate estimate for the Type 1 partial fl factors (approximate MLG factors) are given in Table 8 as in the case of Plant 1 diesel generators using Eqn. (26), these are the partial fl factors that shall be used with PRA calculatioas. As shown, the partial fl factors in Plant 2 compared to Plain 1 indicates a very strong dependency and a potential for common-mode failure. From Section2.3, we defined the parametera k, asa dependency indicator, with Expression(23), which is the ratio of the en_piric_l (observed) Minimal Cycle Durations over the theoretical ones. We introduced the general idea that, if a shock hasoccurred, the observed Minimal C_cle Durations will be shorter than the theoretical ones. However, for the caseof the Plant 2 diesel generators, one very interesting phenomenon can be observed. The observed and theoretical Minimal Cycle Durations (MCD), given in Table 9 , show that the observed MCD did not decreasein comparison with the theoretical MCD, but even increased. The reason for this phenomenonis that the (failure) behavior of the diesel generators is not constant in time, but shows trends. If the failure data is screened more closely, it can be seen that from the beginning of the observations to December 1989, the failures occm. _d independently, However, from December 1989 to the end of the observation period, there is a clear trend in the failures to be affected by dependencies. ii --This phenomenon was not a surprise. The CUSUM test had detected the trends, and we also found that a mixture of exponentials fitted the data better than a single exponential. The mixture fits better, in this case, because it can take into account separately the contributions from the independent trend and h'om the dependent trend.
We note that this discussion about the phenomenon caused by trends is of more academical than of practical interest. If an end user wants more accurate figures for the unavailability (or for/_ factors) taking into account dependencies, the methods described in this report can be used directly.
If the field failure data is divided into "before December 1989" and "after December 1989,"the trends we have described can be clearly identified fTom the results obtained, using the methods described in this report. Table 10 shows the results for the "before December 1989" period. ,., Table 10 shows that the observed and theoretical MCD are very close to each other for cycles of 2, 3, and 5 failures. For the cycle of 4 failures, the observed MCD is slightly larger than the theoretical MCD, indicating no dependencies were detected between any four diesels. The unavailabilities also are close to each other for ali cycles. For the cycle of 4 failures, the exact calculation including dependency is slightly less than the exact calculation without dependency; as stated, this is the result of no dependencies detected between any four diesels. For the cycle of 5 failures, the exact calculation including dependency is about twice as large as the exact calculation without dependency. Table 11 shows the results for the "after December 1989" period. Table 11 clearly indicates the dependency effect for the "after December 1989" period. The observed MCD is shorter than the theoretical MCD for ali cycles, and the exact calculation without dependency underestimates the unavailability for ali cycles (2, 3, 4, and 5). For cycles 4 and 5 the underestimation is as much as one order of magnitude.
In conclusion, this pilot application supports the idea that the recent incident involving the unavailability of multiple diesel generators most probably was caused by the dependency. Furthermore, we can show that dependent failures have significantly increased after 1989. Summarizing the findings from the pilot applications for plants 1 and 2, we make the following conclusions.
Dependency varies significantly from plant to plant. Even within a plant and a system dependency varies with time. The effect of dependency on system unavailability is significant and increases with the number of redundancies. The variation among the plants and with time is strongly indicative of a dynamic behavior which best can be used in dynamic PSA.
Pilot Application for Plants 3,415, and 6
The objective of this pilot application was to analyze dependent failures in a standard system across several plants. The system selected was the breakers associated with the slow and fast operation of Containment Fans (CF) in Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs). Table 12 shows the unavailability results for the four plants (Plant 3, 4, 5, and 6) for Cases 1, 2, and 3, as defined earlier.
The following conclusions can be made from this table.
1. The breaker failure rate is consistent among the four plants. A single breaker unavailability for a test interval of one month can be obtained from the values of" Unavailability of at least one component" from Table 12 , divided by the number of redundant components (i.e., "4" for this pilot application). Single breaker unavailability derived from this data ranges between 2.5E-2 to 3.1E-2, that translates to failure rates from 6.0E-5 to 9.0E-5 per hour.
2. Even though the single breaker failure rate and unavailability is consistent among the four plants, the multiple breaker failures varies from a plant to plant, depending on the degree of the dependency among the times of failures. As an example, the unavailability of the four breakers varies from 1.6E-5 to 4.76E-6, about a factor of 4.
3. Ali the four plants show a clear dependency contribution to varying degrees. To better understand the degree of dependency, the partial fl factors and the overall single fl factor for ali the four components for Types 1 and 2, as defined before, were calculated (Table  13) . To better clarify the degree of dependency, we calculated the fraction of the unavailability of the four breakers that is attributed by the dependency. This is shown in 
CONCLUSIONS
This report introduces a new perspective on the basic concept of dependent failures where the definition of dependency is based on clustering in failure times of similar components. This perspective has two significant implications: firstly, it relaxes the conventional assumption that dependent failures must be simultaneous and result from a severe shock; secondly, it allows the analyst to use ali the failures in a time continuum to estimate the potential for multiple failures in a window of time (e.g., a test interval), therefore arriving at a more accurate value for system unavailability. In addition, the models developed here (including the Appendices in Volume 2) provide a method for plant-specific analysis of dependency, reflecting the plant-specific maintenance practices that reduce or increase the contribution of dependent failures to system unavailability.
The proposed methodology, as discussed in Volume 2, can be used for screening analysis of failure data to estimate the fraction of dependent failures among the failures. In addition, the proposed method can evaluate the impact of the observed dependency on the system unavailability and plant risk.
The formulations derived in this report have undergone various levels of validations through computer simulation studies and pilot applications. For example, the pilot applications of these methodologies, as discussed in Chapter 3 and Appendix G of Volume 2, showed that the contribution of dependent failures of diesel generators in one plant was negligible, while in another plant, it was quite significant, lt also showed that in the plant with significant contribution of dependency to Emergency Power System (EPS) unavailability, the contribution changed with time. Similar findings were reported for the Containment Fan Cooler breakers (Appendix G). Drawing such conclusions about system performance would not have been possible with any other reported dependency methodologies. The validation studies through computer simulation also showed that the formulation of system unavailability based on this new methodology is sound and more accurate than the conventional methods for estimating system unavailability presently used in PRAs.
From the results of these validation studies we draw the following conclusions:
1. The methodology is sound and provides accurate estimates when compared to underlying simulated results.
2.
The new formulation of the system unavailability accounting for clustering parameters provides a more accurate and justifiable estimate of system unavailability than using standard PRA techniques. The difference in the two estimates in a system with a high level of redundancy can be quite significant; this is mainly due to the inherent approximation in PRA-type calculations.
3. The proposed model can be applied to plant-specific data and accounts for specific plant maintenance and surveillance activities. Conventional common-cause models, on the other hand, are usually based on industry-wide data and gives no credit to plant-specific maintenance practices. The pilot applications reported in this volume and detailed in Appendix G of Volume 2, demonstrates the power and the capability of the methodologies in addressing the plant-specific dependency by analyzing the clustering of failures.
4. The effect of the clustering of failures on system unavailability is significant, as verified both by simulation studies and by pilot applications, (typically, one order of magnitude). Such an effect could change the perceived risk profile of the plant and the prioritization of dominant accident sequences and accident sequence minimal cut sets.
5.
Software is being developed to analyze times between failures to estimate dependency parameters and generate estimates of the conventional beta factors presently used in PRAs. Appendix C outlines a road map of how the approach can be extended beyond the system unavailability calculations for estimating the plant core damage probability and risk.
We believe these methods and software can be useful to analyze the failure data to estimate the fraction of dependent failures, and to evaluate its impact on system unavailability. At the same time, further work is needed before these methods can be used in conventional PRAs to evaluate a plantspecific risk profile. We also showed that the methods can evaluate the safety significance of dependent failures, their plant-specific nature, and their dynamic variations with time. These methods appear useful to enhance early detection of risk significant dependencies and to take prompt cx_rrective actions.
